Verify inherited network namespace entry

Add private `enter_netns()` bootstrap validation before actor runtime
integration.

Deats,
- verify the inherited FD against its expected namespace inode
- constrain `setns()` to Linux network namespaces
- verify `/proc/self/ns/net` after the entry syscall
- leave inherited FD ownership to the future spawn caller
- exercise guards with real FDs and unprivileged syscall fakes

Prompt-IO: ai/prompt-io/opencode/20260827T232500Z_d067505a_prompt_io.md

(this patch was generated in some part by `opencode` using `gpt-5.6-sol` (`openai`))
wkt/wg_pyroute2_read
Gud Boi 2026-08-27 20:19:45 -04:00
parent d0261787fd
commit 503a3ed766
5 changed files with 318 additions and 0 deletions

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---
model: gpt-5.6-sol
service: opencode
session: tractor-addr-unpacking
timestamp: 2026-08-27T23:25:00Z
git_ref: d067505a
scope: code
substantive: true
raw_file: 20260827T232500Z_d067505a_prompt_io.raw.md
---
## Prompt
After committing the reviewed bindspace-reference changes, the human
asked to continue with the next Layer C increment.
## Response summary
Added the private Linux network-namespace entry primitive required by
future child bootstrap wiring. It verifies the inherited capability
before `setns()`, constrains entry to network namespaces, and verifies
the resulting process namespace before runtime initialization proceeds.
## Files changed
- `tractor/spawn/_netns.py` - synchronous verified netns entry.
- `tests/test_netns_spawn.py` - stale-FD, syscall and post-entry guards.
- `ai/tpt-backends/03_wg_tunnel_bindspace.md` - primitive ownership and
remaining integration boundary.
## Human edits
The human requested the next incremental implementation after accepting
the prior split commits. Their established preference for end-to-end
tests informed use of real FDs where possible; only privileged `setns()`
and procfs observation are replaced to keep the suite unprivileged. In
staged review, the human requested the full project license header,
explicit comments on both intentional inode mismatches, and independent
call traces proving both fake syscall and procfs hooks execute. The
agent applied those human-directed revisions; no direct manual source
edits were observed.

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---
model: gpt-5.6-sol
service: opencode
timestamp: 2026-08-27T23:25:00Z
git_ref: d067505a
diff_cmd: git diff HEAD~1..HEAD
---
# Raw output - verify pre-runtime netns entry
After committing realized bindspace references and their deferred codec
plan, the human requested the next Layer C increment.
> `git diff HEAD~1..HEAD -- tractor/spawn/_netns.py tests/test_netns_spawn.py ai/tpt-backends/03_wg_tunnel_bindspace.md`
Added a private synchronous `enter_netns()` bootstrap primitive. It
validates the inherited FD and expected inode, constrains `setns()` to
`CLONE_NEWNET`, verifies `/proc/self/ns/net` afterward, and leaves FD
closure to the future spawn-bootstrap caller.
Tests use real stand-in FDs while replacing only the privileged syscall
and post-entry procfs observation. They prove stale FDs fail before
entry, the syscall receives the exact namespace type, and bootstrap
rejects an unexpected post-entry namespace. Ruff and all three focused
tests passed.

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@ -621,6 +621,12 @@ server bound in the old namespace.
- the child spawn/bootstrap trampoline calls `setns()` **before**
`_runtime.async_main()`, `IPCServer.listen_on()`, parent-channel
connection, or creation of any worker thread/socket.
- `spawn._netns.enter_netns()` is the first private bootstrap
primitive: it checks the inherited FD against the expected inode,
calls `setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNET)`, and verifies
`/proc/self/ns/net` before returning. It deliberately does not own
or close the FD; spawn propagation and status reporting remain the
caller's next integration boundary.
- only after successful entry does the child drop namespace-entry
privileges and initialize the actor runtime.
- a root/single-actor process follows the same ordering: enter during

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'''
Pre-runtime Linux network-namespace entry validation.
'''
from __future__ import annotations
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace
from typing import BinaryIO
import pytest
from tractor.spawn import _netns
def test_enter_netns_rejects_mismatched_inherited_fd(
tmp_path: Path,
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
'''
A stale inherited FD must not enter a replacement namespace.
Open a real stand-in FD, declare a different expected inode and
replace `os.setns()` with a failure sentinel. The inode check must
reject the capability before any irreversible namespace entry.
'''
token_path: Path = tmp_path / 'netns'
token_path.touch()
def fail_setns(namespace_fd: int, nstype: int) -> None:
raise AssertionError('`setns()` must not be called')
monkeypatch.setattr(_netns.os, 'setns', fail_setns)
namespace_file: BinaryIO
with token_path.open('rb') as namespace_file:
inode: int = token_path.stat().st_ino
with pytest.raises(
ValueError,
match=f'{inode}.*{inode + 1}',
):
_netns.enter_netns(
namespace_file.fileno(),
# Deliberately differ from `token_path`'s inode.
inode + 1,
)
def test_enter_netns_verifies_post_entry_inode(
tmp_path: Path,
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
'''
Successful `setns()` is insufficient without post-entry proof.
Use a real inherited FD and fake only the privileged syscall and
`/proc/self/ns/net` observation. The recorded calls prove both
hooks execute and `CLONE_NEWNET` constrains the namespace type;
the returned inode proves bootstrap observed the expected netns.
'''
token_path: Path = tmp_path / 'netns'
token_path.touch()
setns_calls: list[tuple[int, int]] = []
stat_calls: list[Path] = []
def fake_setns(namespace_fd: int, nstype: int) -> None:
setns_calls.append((namespace_fd, nstype))
def fake_stat(path: Path) -> SimpleNamespace:
stat_calls.append(path)
return SimpleNamespace(st_ino=inode)
namespace_file: BinaryIO
with token_path.open('rb') as namespace_file:
namespace_fd: int = namespace_file.fileno()
inode: int = token_path.stat().st_ino
monkeypatch.setattr(_netns.os, 'setns', fake_setns)
monkeypatch.setattr(
type(_netns._SELF_NETNS),
'stat',
fake_stat,
)
entered_inode: int = _netns.enter_netns(
namespace_fd,
inode,
)
assert setns_calls == [
(namespace_fd, _netns.os.CLONE_NEWNET),
]
assert stat_calls == [_netns._SELF_NETNS]
assert entered_inode == inode
def test_enter_netns_rejects_wrong_post_entry_namespace(
tmp_path: Path,
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
'''
Bootstrap must stop when the process lands in an unexpected netns.
Let the inherited FD check and fake syscall succeed, then report a
different `/proc/self/ns/net` inode. The post-entry guard must raise
instead of allowing actor runtime sockets to start in the wrong
namespace.
'''
token_path: Path = tmp_path / 'netns'
token_path.touch()
def fake_setns(namespace_fd: int, nstype: int) -> None:
return None
monkeypatch.setattr(
_netns.os,
'setns',
fake_setns,
)
namespace_file: BinaryIO
with token_path.open('rb') as namespace_file:
inode: int = token_path.stat().st_ino
def fake_stat(path: Path) -> SimpleNamespace:
return SimpleNamespace(st_ino=inode + 1)
monkeypatch.setattr(
type(_netns._SELF_NETNS),
'stat',
fake_stat,
)
with pytest.raises(
RuntimeError,
match=f'{inode + 1}.*{inode}',
):
_netns.enter_netns(
namespace_file.fileno(),
# Deliberately differ from `fake_stat()`'s inode + 1.
inode,
)

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# tractor: structured concurrent "actors".
# Copyright 2018-eternity Tyler Goodlet.
# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
# it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
# GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
# You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
# along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
'''
Linux network-namespace actor-bootstrap primitives.
'''
from __future__ import annotations
from collections.abc import Callable
from pathlib import Path
import os
import sys
_SELF_NETNS: Path = Path('/proc/self/ns/net')
def enter_netns(
namespace_fd: int,
expected_inode: int,
) -> int:
'''
Enter and verify one inherited Linux network namespace.
The future spawn-bootstrap caller owns and closes `namespace_fd`.
'''
if sys.platform != 'linux':
raise RuntimeError(
'Network namespace entry is Linux-only!'
)
if (
type(namespace_fd) is not int
or
namespace_fd < 0
):
raise ValueError(
'`namespace_fd` must be a non-negative `int`!'
)
if (
type(expected_inode) is not int
or
expected_inode <= 0
):
raise ValueError(
'`expected_inode` must be a positive `int`!'
)
setns: Callable[[int, int], None]|None = getattr(
os,
'setns',
None,
)
clone_newnet: int|None = getattr(
os,
'CLONE_NEWNET',
None,
)
if (
setns is None
or
clone_newnet is None
):
raise RuntimeError(
'Python has no Linux network namespace entry support!'
)
inherited_inode: int = os.fstat(namespace_fd).st_ino
if inherited_inode != expected_inode:
raise ValueError(
f'Inherited namespace FD inode {inherited_inode} does not '
f'match expected inode {expected_inode}!'
)
try:
setns(namespace_fd, clone_newnet)
except OSError as exc:
raise RuntimeError(
f'Could not enter network namespace inode '
f'{expected_inode}!'
) from exc
entered_inode: int = _SELF_NETNS.stat().st_ino
if entered_inode != expected_inode:
raise RuntimeError(
f'Entered network namespace inode {entered_inode} does not '
f'match expected inode {expected_inode}!'
)
return entered_inode